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Introduction
Advancing technology changes the fabric of global society, from electricity to the rise of social media, yet law has always struggled to keep pace with such 
technological advances,[2] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn2) and this problem has accelerated with the 
increased pace of technological change in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.[3] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn3) Although modern society is faced with a multitude of issues springing from new technologies, law and governance structures have 
lagged[4] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn4) while the technologies themselves have advanced.[5] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn5) This discrepancy between technology and law is particularly glaring in the 
artificial intelligence (“AI”) field. Though the solution to creating “true” artificial general intelligence is still elusive,[6] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-
4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn6) “weak” forms of the technology are altering the fabric of society, from social media[7] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn7) to the orchestration of war.[8] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-
A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn8) These technological advances remake everyday existence, yet global regulatory functions are not sufficiently robust to 
oversee these changes.
The fact that international law has not yet exhibited meaningful regulatory control over artificial intelligence technology does not mean that itcannot. 
International law offers a structure of governance over issues that are too broad for unilateral state regulation, or that implicate international interests.[9] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn9) Although international law has often been denigrated as weak,[10] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn10) it has great potential to offer solutions for global problems that are too large 
for states to tackle alone. This note seeks to unveil the benefits of using international law to approach the problems and potential of AI as well as suggest a 
possible method of doing so that can increase regulation and aid in the development and advancement of safe AI technology.
Part I will provide a succinct overview of the current state of artificial intelligence, including the various types of autonomous states of technologies. Section 
A will include a discussion of the definitions of relevant technologies as well as their modern uses. Section B will touch briefly on several examples of the 
legal and regulatory issues that have arisen from this technological paradigm. Section A of Part II will discuss the current state of international legal and 
regulatory structures, while Section B will consider how international law might provide regulation and oversight of this advancing technological sector. 
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Section C of Part II will examine several national and international policies regulating artificial intelligence and what lessons can be drawn from existing 
structures. Section A of Part III will then draw from institutions and structures offered in Part II, Section B, as well as best practices considered in Section C. 
Here, I will argue that international law offers the best path forward to functional oversight, regulation, and promotion of advancing AI technologies, and 
will propose a framework for such an international regulatory structure. Section B of Part III will briefly answer questions related to why international law is 
not already in use. Finally, Part IV will conclude with a few remarks about both the potential and danger inherent in advancing AI technology and reiterate 
the call for international regulation and oversight.
I.  Artificial Intelligence in the Modern World
A.  Understanding Artificial Intelligence: Definitions and Current State of Technology
AI is ubiquitous in popular culture,[11] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn11) but the reality of the technology is much 
different than popular imaginings. AI can be divided into two general categories: “weak” or “specific” AI and “strong” or “general” AI.[12] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn12) “Weak” or “specific” AI is an application or system with a specific function, in 
which the AI often “outperform[s] even the most expert humans.”[13] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn13) “Strong” 
or “general” AI (often referred to as artificial general intelligence, or AGI), on the other hand, is more akin to the AI of pop culture, where the program or 
system is not merely “specifically” gifted but rather achieves “human-level” performance across a spectrum of individual challenges that would allow the AI 
to “think.”[14] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn14) Though AGI is not yet realized, researchers have 
made progress on several fronts related to general intelligence, including visual analysis, object recognition, and behavioral interactions.[15] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn15) Specific intelligences, on the other hand, are common, operating as systems 
that are designed to follow a “special-purpose algorithm,” which may render the program an expert search engine[16] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-
4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn16) or chess player,[17] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn17) but 
incapable of harnessing human ‘common sense.’
A discussion of AI necessitates one of automation. Paul Scharre notes three degrees of autonomy that are helpful when discussing AI.[18] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn18) First, semiautonomous operations are those in which “the machine performs a 
task and then waits for a human user to take an action before continuing;”[19] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn19) 
or “human in the loop” processes.[20] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn20) Second, there are supervised 
autonomous operations in which, once in operation, “the machine can sense, decide, and act on its own, but a human observer can . . . intervene;” or 
“human on the loop” processes.[21] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn21) Finally, there are fully autonomous 
operations, in which “systems sense, decide, and act entirely without human intervention;” or “human out of the loop” processes.[22] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn22) Programs often move among these types of processes when completing a task 
and they can be conceived of as a continuum: as programs grow more sophisticated, they require less human intervention and oversight to complete tasks.
[23] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn23)
There is also a difference between automatic, automated, and autonomous intelligence in machines. Automatic programs are simple, highly predictable, 
and display no decision-making qualities.[24] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn24) Automated programs are more 
complex, rule-based systems that may consider a range of variables before acting.[25] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn25) Autonomous programs are sophisticated, goal-oriented, and may be considerably less predictable in their processes.[26] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn26) Like process levels, intelligence levels operate on a spectrum, with intelligence 
growing as a program moves down the continuum from automatic to autonomous.[27] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn27) Autonomous programs do not “think;” if their processes are opaque it is because there is not a simple connection between input 
and output as there is in an automatic program; rather, autonomous, “goal-oriented” systems assimilate a wide variety of input and produce an output 
through a process that may be unintelligible to human observers.[28] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn28)
B.  AI Interactions with the Modern World: Influence, Benefits, and Dangers
Understanding AI as more than the humanoid robot or omnipotent mastermind enables a deeper understanding of the ways in which AI technology already 
interacts with and influences global society, as well as of the reasons why greater regulation and oversight is beneficial. AI operates across a multitude of 
sectors, influencing fields from social media to the global economy and everything in between. The following examples highlight the benefits and the 
dangers of continually advancing, and often under- or unregulated artificial intelligence technologies.
The first example occurred on May 6, 2010, when the Dow Jones industrial average careened wildly, losing nearly ten percent of its value in just under 
fifteen minutes and then, within a half hour, rebounded it its prior level.[29] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn29) Following investigations into what became known as the “Flash Crash,” it became clear that the crisis, which was described by 
traders as “horrifying,”[30] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn30) had been set off by a single trading algorithm 
programmed to sell off a specific type of contract.[31] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn31) These contracts were in 
turn purchased by specifically programmed purchasing algorithms; the competing algorithms entered into a fast-paced trading race, in which the pace of 
trade triggered other algorithms to offload their contracts as well, interpreting the fast pace of trading as high liquidity.[32] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-
4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn32) Although stability was soon restored, at the peak of the crisis, “a trillion dollars had been wiped off the 
market” and investors around the world were shaken.[33] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn33)
The Flash Crash was not the result of a rogue algorithm or of a weak AI breaking away from programming. It was an example of a weak AI following its 
programming to the letter in spite of the catastrophic effects of doing so. The Flash Crash was caused by human programmers’ failure to understand the 
effects of their algorithm following its directive to its logical conclusion.[34] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn34) While the use of algorithmic programming granted benefits in the form of higher trade volume, the potential danger of unforeseen 
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programming consequences clearly played out.
Another illustrative example is the infamous case of Stuxnet malware, which was created to compromise the Siemens machines controlling centrifuges in 
Iran’s Natanz nuclear facility.[35] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn35) Though the facility did not suffer 
catastrophic damage from Stuxnet, the attacks did reduce the lifetime of the centrifuges, as well as undermining confidence in the security of the Iranian 
facility.[36] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn36) In addition to these long-term deleterious effects of the program, 
Stuxnet also ushered in a new era of cyber warfare, hailed as the world’s “first military grade cyber weapon.”[37] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-
4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn37)
Stuxnet heralded a sea change in malware; the virus was not contained in the Natanz facility but spread globally, likely transferred by laptops or USB 
drives infected with the virus.[38] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn38) Though Stuxnet was designed to attack a 
specific make of Siemens controller, its presence on the internet affords hackers and programmers with access to the virus’ blueprints an opportunity to 
dismantle, alter, and learn from the way Stuxnet operates.[39] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn39) Concern over 
such cyberattacks has only increased since this first major international incident occurred.[40] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn40)
These cases point to a sector of technology and innovation that is advancing—or, perhaps, has advanced—past the point of legal and regulatory control.
[41] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn41) This note offers these instances as examples of just a few of the diverse 
situations in which advancing AI and automation technology would benefit from a system of oversight and regulation.
II.  International Law: Promises, Failings, and Potential 
A.  Why International Law?
The rise and increased visibility of the modern international legal system developed in the post-World War II and Cold War eras.[42] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn42) International law is “the legal order … meant to structure the interaction 
between entities participating in and shaping international relations.”[43] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn43) Some scholars have argued that international law is not “law,” per se[44] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn44) given its lack of authority and enforcement structures,[45] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn45) but others have noted that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law … almost all of the time.”[46] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn46) International law can help preserve peace and security, manage interstate 
social and economic disputes, and protect the interests of the international community as a whole.[47] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn47)
AI is a problem—like the global arms race or climate change—that implicates all of global society.[48] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn48) Whether operating in financial markets, conflict situations, or social media and data-gathering, advancing AI crosses and will 
continue to cross national boundaries; as Erdélyi and Goldsmith suggest, purely national responses to this rising challenge may conflict and create more 
problems than they solve.[49] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn49) Furthermore, isolated national or corporate 
attempts to solve the emerging research and regulatory problems created by AI may be hasty, ignoring investments in safety to be first to reach a 
benchmark in machine intelligence.[50] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn50) Advancing AI creates an opportunity 
for international law to step into a gap that national law is not sufficient to fill.
The problem arises from the fact that international law is not law in the traditional sense of national law in which the sovereign creates the system of laws by 
which its citizens abide.[51] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn51) In the international legal systems, the states 
engaging in the system are themselves sovereign.[52] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn52) The pertinent questions 
then become: In what circumstances do states comply with international law and international obligations, and how can this general compliance be used to 
create an international structure of governance and oversight for advancing AI technology
B.  Under What Circumstance Do States Adhere to International Law? 
Academics and international law practitioners have long questioned why states seem to mostly follow international law. This law, which is composed not 
only of the formal treaties between states but also of more the general principles of customary international law,[53] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-
4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn53) has been able to function more or less effectively for centuries, despite its lack of total enforcement power over 
sovereign states. Though the debates behind why states recognize international law are intense and ongoing,[54] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-
4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn54) of more particular interest to this examination are the following questions: Under what circumstances do states follow 
international law, and how can this knowledge be applied to the creation of an international governance structure for advancing AI?
Despite arguments that states are not obligated to follow international law,[55] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn55) there are more instances of states complying with international laws than not.[56] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-
A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn56) The commonality in many of these instances may be, rather than some sense of morality or complicated philosophical 
principle, the less benign and more realist idea of state self-interest.[57] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn57) States, though they regularly come together to work toward some common purpose, are individual actors that must shape their 
own policy considerations towards international issues.[58] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn58) The goal for 
international law is to provide regimes that states can follow that achieve international legal goals while also providing an appealing choice to state self-
interest. Such a choice to follow international law can be seen in the disarmament treaties and in international cooperation on nuclear technology that 
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began in the 1950s, and many of these arrangements continue to have a high level of state adherence today.[59] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-
4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn59)
As previously noted, international law is most useful in circumstances in which one state alone is not capable of managing a problem, or when the interests 
of the international community as a whole are implicated.[60] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn60) Although 
adherence is not perfect, existential world crises have seen a majority of involved states come to the table and negotiate an international solution through 
the auspices of international law.[61] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn61) Where advancing AI technology does 
not neatly align with existing international norms, it is necessary to create new structures of governance;[62] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-
A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn62) which, like those governing arms proliferation, nuclear weapons, and climate change, advance an international policy 
goal and offer states benefits they would not be able to gain on their own. Jana von Stein notes that this type of mechanism, combining “the proverbial 
carrots and sticks; technical and financial assistance; [and] tying good behavior to a particular identity” can be quite effective in holding states to 
compliance with international law and institutions.[63] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn63) This research 
encourages a self-interested view of state compliance, one in which any new international law regime will need to offer states an incentive to comply with its 
norms.[64] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn64)
Examples from other crises clearly show that the mere existence of an existential threat to international society is not necessarily enough to compel full 
compliance with international law and norms.[65] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn65) It is therefore necessary to 
make compliance with any international regulatory scheme more attractive to states. Increasing the benefits of compliance can be done in two parallel 
ways. First, create a system where compliance itself is valuable for states’ reputations.[66] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn66) Where states are seen as upholding their international obligations and complying with international laws and norms, other states 
may be more willing to enter into future agreements, grant more generous concessions in future negotiations, or cooperate on economic and regulatory 
projects.[67] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn67)
Second, benefits to a state’s self-interest arise when compliance with international law grants the state some type of tangible gain. For example, although 
membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) requires some concessions, member states are also able to access preferential trading with partners.
[68] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn68) Creating a regulatory system that engenders state adherence around AI 
policy must keep three goals in mind: (1) provide a solution to a problem implicating the interests of the international community; (2) create a structure in 
which adherence to international norms creates a virtuous compliance cycle; and (3) incentivize states to comply with the governance structure’s policies 
through tangible gains given to member states.
C.  Regulatory Efforts, Recommendations, and Their Messages
Despite the lack of an overarching regulatory structure, there have been various state, multi-national, and non-governmental attempts to introduce 
coherence and regulatory oversight to AI research and use. NGOs, expert agencies, and even the United Nations have urged greater oversight of AI 
advances, while several states have also released plans for the advancement of AI technology. Multiple NGOs and other non-state actors have spoken out 
in favor of increasing regulation and oversight of AI research and use. Some include calls for increased regulation, while others offer paths forward or 
designs to emulate.[69] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn69) These are not merely specialist organizations, but 
rather some of the most well-known and integrated NGOs: in 2015, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) 
launched its Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics, which was created to “educate and inform stakeholders . . . [and] progress discussion on robotics 
and artificial intelligence governance.”[70] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn70)
Law and AI experts have called for international regulation and oversight of AI technology and use. One highly relevant proposal is creation of a new 
international organization to encourage policy discussion and eventual regulation of AI-related matters, which, though beginning as a voluntary advising 
body, could gain enforcement and oversight powers.[71] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn71) One such body, the 
Center for the Governance of AI, is active at the international level, speaking to non-governmental research groups as well as national governments about 
the possible dangers and benefits of AI, as well as of policy paths forward to minimize the risks and establish a structure of development and governance 
for AI technology.[72] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn72)
Much has also been proposed regarding the regulation of autonomous weapons; sensible, given their immense potential harm the increasing use of semi-
autonomous[73] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn73) and autonomous weapons[74] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn74) in the field. In 2012, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots was founded.[75] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn75) This campaign, organized to stop the use of fully autonomous lethal weapons 
and maintain human control over the use of force, is supported by nearly 120 national, regional, and international NGOs.[76] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn76) Others have called for a more “vibrant, measured, and mature discussion of 
the relevant legal issues,”[77] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn77)arguing that the law of armed conflict will be 
shaped by the use of such autonomous weapons[78] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn78) and that a ban of such 
systems would ignore the military practicalities and political complexities that are already tied into states developing autonomous weapons systems.[79] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn79)
Several national and supranational actors have also made steps forward in AI regulation and oversight. In June 2018, the European Union (“EU”) named 
52 experts to its High Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence, which aims to produce policy recommendations on social, political, economic, and 
ethical issues related to AI, as well as balance economic competitiveness concerns tied to transparency, data-protection, and fairness.[80] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn80) In December 2018, the group published its draft AI Ethics Guidelines, which 
aims to “maximize the benefits of AI while minimising its risks” by “ensuring an ‘ethical purpose’ . . . and [being] technically robust.”[81] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn81)
Over twenty-five states have announced their AI strategies or have published plans for future strategies, including the US, Russia, China, and India.[82] 
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(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn82) Many plans focus on maintaining a competitive edge in the emerging AI 
market, although several also consider the ethical and safety elements of advancing AI.[83] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn83) One strategy notable in its attention to safe progress is the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) attitude towards the development 
of autonomous weapons systems, which might be extrapolated to encompass advanced AI research.[84] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-
A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn84)
The DoD’s Directive 3000.09 (“Autonomy in Weapons Systems”) creates three classes of weapons systems that are given a “green light” for development 
and use.[85] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn85) For proposed systems that would use autonomy or intelligence 
outside of these categories, the system issues a “yellow light,” requiring review before any further development of the technology, and then a second review 
before field use of the system.[86] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn86) Although this policy is created specifically 
for autonomous and intelligent weapons systems, its stated goal of “[minimizing] the probability and consequences of failures in autonomous [systems]”[87] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn87) is one that can easily be transferred to AI, creating a system of checks and 
review that would allow greater investment in safety in and control over the advancement of AI.[88] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn88)
Although none of these proposals are truly international in scope, many of them offer strong elements that could be incorporated into an international 
regulatory regime, including the American policy discussed above,[89] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn89) or the 
Centre for the Governance of AI’s proposed research and development guidelines.[90] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn90) Drawing from best practices of states and NGOs would be beneficial to the proposed regulatory body, and would allow it to 
begin with a strong foundation.
III.  Global Governance of AI: Oversight, Regulation, and Promotion 
A.  The Regulatory Promise and Potential of International Law
International law has most relevance where national law is not sufficient to protect the interests of global society; the advancement of AI presents an 
opportunity for greater robustness of international regulatory structures.[91] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn91) The growth of AI technology calls for a response from international society. International law and institutions, calling upon both 
states’ tendencies to comply with international law when doing so is seen as virtuous[92] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn92) and upon states’ individual self-interest, may be able to create a regulatory regime that is attractive enough to compel adherence 
from a majority of state players.[93] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn93) Such a regime would not seek to halt 
research on and development of AI, but to pursue such research and development safely and intentionally.[94] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-
4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn94)
The most traditional method of international cooperation is, as recommended in multiple other publications,[95] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-
4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn95) the creation of an international treaty. This proposal offers a more incentivized approach: the creation of an 
international body of collaborating scientists, researchers, and experts in the field— both civilian and governmental— whose research and collaborative 
efforts are available only to parties to the treaty. A similar body has been used in response to a broad range of “global catastrophic risks” or “existential 
risks,”[96] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn96) proposing a regulatory body controlled by a group of experts to 
govern member states of previously created treaties.[97] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn97) This body of experts 
should include experts from civil society as well as government representatives, to promote transparency in regulation and oversight.[98] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn98) Leveraging the potential international pitfalls of unregulated AI, the treaty 
body could create a regime in which a state’s refusal to sign and ratify the new AI treaty and become part of the regulatory institution is seen as damaging 
to its reputation.[99] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn99) Encouraging consideration of the “global catastrophic 
risks” that might occur should state refuse to comply could also be a motivator.
The combination of these recommendations is the creation of a new international treaty body, overseen by the United Nations (possibly drawing from 
UNICRI, which already has subject-matter expertise on AI)[100] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn100) paired with 
an expert body or advisory panel serving the members of the new treaty. While the proposed treaty would provide general guidelines for member states on 
research and development of advancing AI, the expert body could provide case-by-case recommendations on new research and controversial 
development proposals. The body could also develop best practices and contribute to important advances through collaborative research.[101] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn101) Ideally, the panel would also represent the cutting edge of AI research and 
development, with ideas shared freely among the body’s members.
While states may be less immediately open to joining, many AI experts have already expressed concern about the direction and speed of research, calling 
for guidance and even delay of certain strands of AI research as well as for more focus on developing AI safely and ethically[102] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn102) and would likely be open to joining a body of this sort. One way to make 
this body more attractive is to encourage the membership and active participation of expert groups such as the American Association for AI and the 
Machine Intelligence Research Institute (“MIRI”)[103] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn103) and individual experts 
such as Max Tegmark[104] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn104) and Nick Bostrom,[105] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn105) all of whom have expressed concerns.[106] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-
4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn106) Participation by these experts in the proposed panel could further incentivize states to join, in order to gain 
access to their research and collaborative technological development.
States are more likely to adhere to international law when doing so promotes some international interest and offers incentives to states’ self-interest. By 
/
offering an answer to the international challenges posed by the expansion of AI across all sectors, including financial, social, and military, the proposed 
treaty and body of experts would protect the interests of the international community. Further, by providing access to an international, collaborative body of 
experts that not only provides best practices recommendations and oversights but also to shared information, pooled resources, and joint research, the 
recommended treaty would offer states and other organizations tangible incentives to both join and adhere to the proposed convention.
A treaty and expert regulatory body could also help control AI advances in the future. While this discussion has focused mainly on weak AI, autonomy, and 
the possibility of creating AGI in the near to middle-term future, many experts are more concerned about the advances that might follow; namely, 
superintelligence,[107] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn107) which is “any intellect that greatly exceeds the 
cognitive performance of humans in virtually all domains of interest.”[108] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn108) Creating a regulatory body in the present will ensure there are safeguards in place in the event that AI technology reaches such 
heights, possibly preventing the disastrous consequences that might result.[109] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn109) These technological advances have not yet arrived, but they are on the horizon,[110] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-
4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn110) and establishing an international oversight body early on could prevent more wicked challenges down the road. 
B.  If International Law Is the Answer, Why Is It Not Currently in Use?
 If the potential gains from the international regulation and cooperation on advancing AI are so immense, why hasn’t an international solution yet been 
accepted? There are two arguments, the first of which is principled and second of which is more pragmatic. First, international law lacks the capacity to 
properly regulate and oversee a field as rapidly advancing as AI.[111] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn111) Second, many powerful states are simply disinterested in international regulation and oversight of advancing AI technology.[112] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn112)
First, some scholars argue that international law cannot create binding legal requirements.[113] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn113) Without an overarching authority or enforcement mechanism, international law would lack the ability to enforce any new AI 
regime it attempted to impose, and thus would not be the preferred method of regulation. This argument can be answered by considering that international 
law, though lacking traditional enforcement power, does have other means, such as international interest, incentives to states, and reputational value to 
encourage compliance.[114] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn114)
Second, international regulation might not be in the best interest of all states. AI is a “dual-use” technology,[115] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-
4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn115) and though few are opposed to the advancement of peaceful uses of AI,[116] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-
4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn116) there has been opposition to advancing military uses.[117] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-
A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn117) Many states, however, have already invested heavily in AI’s military potential[118] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-
4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn118) and prefer a regime governed by national regulation. This “race dynamic,” where actors refuse to cooperate out of 
fear that they will not achieve a new technology first,[119] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn119) emerges in recent 
research on public feelings about AI: in a January 2019 poll, more American respondents answered that they believed advancing AI could do more harm 
than good, yet there was uncertainty as to who, if anyone, should control that advancement.[120] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn120) There is a related concern that if other states are developing unsavory advances for AI, your state should as well,[121] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn121) regardless of any regulatory structure.[122] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-
4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn122)
This second set of arguments, however, merely repeats several underlying reasons for regulating AI in the first place, and can be answered by the promise 
inherent in an international regulatory structure that, through a series of incentives and reputational elements,[123] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-
4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn123) can gain a level of adherence high enough to undermine bad actors. Despite its flaws, international law still offers 
the best opportunity for true oversight and guidance of advancing AI.
IV.  Conclusion
At the conclusion of his book Superintelligence, Nick Bostrom writes:
Before the prospect of an intelligence explosion, we humans are like small children playing with a bomb. Such is the mismatch between the 
power of our plaything and the immaturity of our conduct… A sensible thing to do would be to put it down gently, quickly back out of the room, 
and contact the nearest adult. Yet . . . some little idiot is bound to press the ignite button just to see what happens. Nor can we attain safety by 
running away . . . nor is there a grownup in sight.[124] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn124)
 Human society has held the nuclear bomb in its hands for well over fifty years,[125] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-
D50A05154DF1#_ftn125) and this new bomb is no different. Although there are dangers, we are equipped to handle them, provided regulatory oversight 
is imposed now rather than after the ignite button has been pressed. International governance offers an answer to the looming promises and pitfalls of 
advancing AI. The proposed regime could provide guidance and safety while also promoting a collaborative spirit that could see AI technology advance 
slightly more swiftly and much more safely.[126] (applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn126) An international body 
focused on safe development and use of AI would promote international welfare, search out solutions that work best, not first,[127] 
(applewebdata://9DD25A98-4670-4858-A106-D50A05154DF1#_ftn127) and ensure that global society benefits from the promise of AI rather than 
suffers from the dangers.
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